

EU common security and defence policy

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EU Common Security Policy (CSDP) lies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which became integrated into the EU Treaties with ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) agreed at Maastricht in 1992. CFSP had its origins in the 1970s with European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC was a somewhat tentative intergovernmental step towards coordinating Member State views on foreign affairs. It was intended to provide a common voice on issues like South African apartheid or the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973, although Council utterances were often rather anodyne to avoid controversy. EPC did, however, create a template for the eventual CFSP which emerged within the so-called 'pillar architecture' of the TEU. In contrast to the supranational 'European community' Pillar I, CFSP in Pillar II was intergovernmental. Common policy required unanimity, and states remained free to pursue sovereign independence in foreign affairs, defence and security included.

CSDP took a while longer to become an operational policy field within EU structures, finally emerging in 1999 following the Helsinki Council (European Council, 1999a). The initiative has mostly centred around humanitarian crisis management. It developed a strongly civilian rather than military orientation, contrary to its earliest ambitions. The Union has consistently promised to deliver 'credible military capability' (UK Parliament, 1999; EU Council Secretariat, 2009; von der Leyen, 2020). This has been slow to develop, and CSDP has been criticised for a lack of strategic coherence. For two decades, it has failed to live up to the rhetoric in CSDP-related announcements and publications. Table 24.1 summarises landmark statements indicating the scale of ambition since the 1990s.

While CSDP has attracted widespread academic interest, it is relatively little known by a public used to assuming that 'NATO does defence' and the EU does little regarding foreign policy, let alone security and defence. CSDP, and even the wider Common Foreign and Security Policy, receives only a tiny fraction of the total EU budget – 'Global Europe' accounting for just 6 percent of the €157.9bn total in 2017 (European Commission, 2020a). Even so, a UK House of Lords Select Committee report described it as an active policy field managing 36 missions

Table 24.1 CSDP core statements and declarations

Source	Key Goals
Petersberg Declaration (Western European Union, 1992, p. 6)	'Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making'
Amsterdam Treaty (1997, Art.17.2)	
Saint Malo Declaration (1998, p. 2)	'Capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'
Helsinki Headline Goal (European Council, 1999a)	Member States must be able to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least a year, military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks
Laeken Summit: Presidency Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 27)	'Declaration of the operational capability of the European Security and Defence Policy'
European Security Strategy (Solana, 2003, p. 11)	'Need to build a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention'
Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2004)	A range of modalities for the setting up and deployment of multifunctional civilian crisis management (CCM) resources in an integrated format
Report on Implementation of the ESS (European Council, 2008)	'[Need to be] more capable, more coherent and more active'
TEU/Consolidated version (Treaty on European Union, 2010, C83/16)	'To implement a CFSP including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world'
HR-VP Ashton in European External Action Service Review (EEAS, 2013, p. 2)	'The EEAS can be a catalyst to bring together the foreign policies of Member States and strengthen the position of the EU in the world'
European Council (2013)	'An effective CSDP (enhances) the security of European citizens and contributes to peace and stability in our neighbourhood and in the broader world'
European Council (2015) conclusions European Parliament (2016)	Council tasks HR with producing EU Global Strategy Report: 'On the way towards a European Defence Union: A White Book as a first step'
EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (EEAS, 2016, pp. 4, 16)	'The [EUGS] nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the EU' 'Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously [as] necessary'
EUGS Implementation Plan (Council of the European Union, 2016, p. 2)	'[A] new Level of Ambition, for consideration and decision by the Council, [which] aims to develop a stronger Union in security and defence, [and] is able to tackle today's threats and challenges more effectively, with the right capabilities, tools and structures to deliver more security for its citizens'

Source	Key Goals
Rome Declaration (European Council, 2017)	'a Union ready to take more responsibilities . . . creating a more competitive and integrated defence industry [and] committed to strengthening its common security and defence . . . in cooperation and complementarity with NATO'
President of the Commission (Juncker, 2017)	'[We need] a drastic step change in European defence. . . . A European Security and Defence Union will help protect our Union, which is exactly what EU citizens expect'

Source: Author's own compilation

over two decades, many quite small, but some with considerable impact in crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian support.

CSDP missions and operations have made a meaningful contribution to EU foreign policy priorities, including the strengthening of the rule of law, security sector reform, conflict prevention, and the tackling of piracy.

(UK Parliament, 2018, para.92)

The same report identifies the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, as particularly successful (UK Parliament, 2018, para. 95). Other important missions include EUFOR Althea, an EU peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the civilian rule of law mission, EULEX Kosovo.

This chapter begins with an overview of the history and development of CSDP in two parts, first the origins of the policy and developments after the landmark Saint Malo Declaration in 1998, then a brief description of the institutional structure which underpins CSDP. The next section explores important and potentially significant institutional initiatives following the UK's Brexit referendum in 2016. An overview of CSDP missions and operations follows, with a focus on the naval operation EU NAVFOR MED Sophia. We then provide a critical assessment of strengths and weaknesses of CSDP. The conclusion to the chapter discusses the implications of the UK's withdrawal from the Union, particularly in the context of the EU Global Strategy ambition of 'strategic autonomy' (EEAS, 2016, p. 4). According to a prominent strategic autonomy advocate, this must mean that 'the EU will become capable of providing for its own defence' (Howorth, 2019, p. 4). Advocates for European strategic autonomy argue that Europe should manage its own collective defence. The United Kingdom leaving the Union undermines both CSDP and the prospects of EU (or European) strategic autonomy, given that Britain is, with France, one of Europe's two leading military powers, capable of 'playing a full-spectrum security and defence role' (Mölling and Giegerich, 2018, p. 1; Martill and Sus, 2018, pp. 857–858; IISS, 2019).

The origins of CSDP

Within a few years of the Treaty on European Union becoming law in 1993, defence officials in France and the United Kingdom were frustrated at the continuing lack of EU military or defence capability. The nearest the Union came to institutionalised engagement in defence

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was through the Western European Union (WEU), which developed out of the 1948 Brussels Treaty and was formally associated with the EU by the Maastricht Treaty, the TEU. The WEU was effectively an intergovernmental talking shop with only a marginal policy implementation role and no impact on capability development. It did, however, deliver the Petersberg Declaration, later incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Post-Maastricht, the WEU should have had a formal role in developing 'a genuine European Union security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters' (Treaty on European Union, 1992, C 191/105). This did not happen, arguably because achieving common commitment to this objective was impossible. The EU comprised diverse perspectives, pro-Atlantic/NATO-oriented states, others more committed to autonomous European defence, and Ireland committed to neutrality (Laursen, 2014, p. 128).

Nevertheless, the common defence ambition received a boost following Tony Blair becoming UK prime minister in 1997. Together with French President Jacques Chirac, the pair presented the Saint Malo Declaration. This contained a commitment to develop capability that would 'equip the EU for robust, autonomous intervention in humanitarian crisis intervention' (Saint Malo Declaration, 1998). The initiative was purely bilateral, but the two leaders made it clear that they looked forward to full participation from other EU Member States. The agreement aspired to give the EU the capability to address objectives identified six years earlier in the Petersberg Declaration (Western European Union, 1992). See Box 24.1.

Box 24.1 Petersberg tasks

The Petersberg Declaration identified several tasks constituting a European Union commitment to deal with the following challenges:

- Joint disarmament operations
- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Military advice and assistance tasks
- Conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation [Article 43(1) TEU]

The Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the EU Treaties; thus, they became an integral part of EU common foreign and security policy (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997, Art.17).

The Petersberg Declaration foreshadowed much of EU common security and defence policy because of its civilian/military (CIV-MIL) orientation, supporting the use of military forces in situations of civilian crisis management (Major and Mölling, 2013; Smith, 2012, 2013). It is an early indication of what became known as the 'comprehensive approach', defined as:

- A stress on preventive action using a full range of EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem (with a spectrum of tools including) military, policing, law, human rights, and economic development resources (Smith, 2012, pp. 265–266).

Source: Western European Union, 1992

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The Blair/Chirac initiative was principally aimed at Germany. Since the Second World War, Germany had undergone a reluctant rearmament that Chancellor Adenauer viewed as inevitable (Chappell, 2012, pp. 50–54). This was accompanied by a firm Atlanticist commitment, acquiescing in US protection during the Cold War, while much of the German population would have favoured an almost pacifist strategic culture. Post-Cold War, Berlin remained committed to embedded multilateralism, eschewing any notion of German military autonomy (Chappell, 2012, pp. 55–64; Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994). Britain and France, in contrast, preferred to lead on building European capability, although they too had different ambitions, the United Kingdom emphasising capability through NATO and France pushing for European autonomy (from the United States). At Saint Malo, both appeared keen to increase EU capability, including autonomy in responding to threats to civilian security.

Saint Malo was probably a response to the EU's inability to forestall the crisis that consumed much of the former Yugoslavia after 1992, especially the Bosnian war that cost over 100,000 lives between 1992 and 1995 (Tabeau and Bijak, 2005, p. 206) and led to an estimated 2.2 million internationally displaced persons and refugees, according to the UNHCR (Tabeau and Bijak, 2005, p. 210).

Some three years after the Dayton Peace Accords which ended the Bosnian War, a mere declaration of a few hundred words at Saint Malo was not enough to facilitate an EU intervention in Kosovo, a province within Serbia. Yet another Balkan war reprised the partisan brutality that had traumatised Bosnia a few years before. There was no EU intervention, despite the severe threat to civilians. Eventually, a NATO intervention ended the Kosovo War in June 1999. At no point during the 1990s did the EU have either the capability or a consensus on how to respond to crises in the former Yugoslav territories (Simms, 2001; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 196; Messas, 1997, p. 322–323; Campbell and Seymour, 1997, pp. 306–309).

Saint Malo focused on humanitarian intervention, but it included the ambition to develop capability, meaning military resources sufficient for robust intervention in peacekeeping, or even peace-making. It also called for autonomous intervention where necessary, independent of NATO or the United States. This was a step-change in European rhetoric around defence and led to significant developments. The next section describes what emerged after the French-British initiative, namely the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.

After Saint Malo

The first European Council summit meeting after Saint Malo was in Cologne under the new German presidency (European Council, 1999b). Mérand contends that Berlin used the presidency to orchestrate a shift towards the Union developing its own military-political structures (Mérand, 2008, p. 119). After Saint Malo, a series of institutional developments occurred, accompanied by rhetorical commitments (see Table 24.1). In December 1999, the Council agreed the Helsinki Headline Goal (European Council, 1999a) with targets for military assets including a force of up to 60,000 troops that could be deployed to a crisis for at least one year, able to implement the full range of Petersberg tasks. In 2001, the Laeken summit officially launched the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (Council of the European Union, 2001). It also affirmed the commitment 'to enhance the European Union's capabilities to carry out crisis-management operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks' (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 2).

CSDP became operational in 2003 and 2004 when the Union launched its first policing and police training missions, mainly in ex-Yugoslav territories, and military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both post-conflict situations.

EUFOR DR CONGO ARTEMIS was a small operation involving just 2,000 mostly French troops. But the operation was EU flagged and followed a UN request and UNSC Resolution 1484. Its significance was that it was the first autonomous EU combat operation, independent of NATO (Homan, 2007). A second military operation in Congo, EUFOR RF CONGO, in 2006, was similarly autonomous, independent of NATO (Major, 2008). These EU military operations conformed to the Petersberg task of peacekeeping. EUFOR Althea in Bosnia began with 7,000 troops. It is still running, now with just a few hundred military personnel. Althea developed an increasingly civilian character, albeit with the potential to upscale to military engagement if needed. The operation contributes eyes and ears for the international community in a still-volatile environment.

A landmark document was the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Solana, 2003). This identified threats to European security, emphasised a commitment to intervene as required in defence of civilians, and stressed the need to improve capability for crisis intervention. Echoing Saint Malo, it urged the development of 'a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention' (Solana, 2003, p. 11).

These initiatives promised solutions to what had been described a decade before as a 'capability expectations gap' in a seminal paper on the Union's lack of preparedness for crisis intervention (Hill, 1993). Critics from think tanks and academia complained that EU rhetoric exceeded action or concrete results. The Union was failing to address the mismatch between being an economic giant through the single market but a political pygmy in terms of its foreign policy role (Piening, 1997, p. 31; Kirchner, 2006, p. 951; Mérand, 2008, p. 16; Risse, 2013). But the Union was not an entirely ineffective foreign policy actor: it could exert influence and was developing 'civilian power' (Duchêne, 1972; Maull, 1990; Telò, 2006; Majone, 2009).

Manners (2002) extended this concept to one of Europe as a normative power, capable of milieu-shaping influence, using non-military instruments in foreign policy. However, the limits of this approach had been cruelly exposed in former Yugoslavia and again in the turmoil following the Arab Uprisings, which began in Tunisia in 2011. The European Union, for all its economic strength and political profile, is only occasionally, and perhaps temporarily, able to shape foreign policy developments through soft power. An example is the interim nuclear non-proliferation deal with Iran, agreed upon in 2013 with the United States a vital component of the agreement. This led to the lifting of economic sanctions and eventually to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed with Iran by the UN Security Council Permanent 5 plus Germany (Arms Control Association, 2020). The 2013 agreement was brokered by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, supported by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Hansard, 2013; Hadfield and Fiott, 2014). The JCPOA deal appeared to break down following President Trump's May 2018 decision to withdraw the United States and impose new sanctions (BBC News, 2018; *New York Times*, 2019). By 2020, the agreement with Iran appeared practically moribund, but there is hope that it may be resuscitated under Joe Biden's presidency from 2021 (Tharoor, 2020).

The Lisbon Treaty (2007) tried to facilitate a greater EU presence in defence and security, but it contained a double caveat regarding sovereignty:

The Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. [This] shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence

policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised within NATO.

(*Treaty on European Union, 2010, C 83/38*)

This affirms that a common EU defence policy shall materialise only with unanimous support from the Council and in accordance with 'the respective constitutional requirements (of Member States)' (*ibid*). This double lock of Council plus individual agreement from Member States effectively compromises any European Union 'common defence'. Despite this, later pronouncements by the Commission president about 'a European Security and Defence Union' (Juncker, 2017), and by the leaders of France and Germany, were widely interpreted as calls for an 'EU army' (*Euroactiv*, 2018).

It took several years for a comprehensive update of Solana's ESS to appear. With a mandate from the European Council (2015), the EU High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini released the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) just days after the UK Brexit referendum (EEAS, 2016). The EUGS again recommended enhanced EU capability in security and defence. A major difference between the ESS and its successor was that the EUGS had benefited from considerable institutional development since 2003. While the Lisbon Treaty reinforced intergovernmentalism, it also provided stronger institutional support for CSDP and more Union engagement in foreign policy. It reinforced the high representative role, now double-hatted as vice-president of the Commission (HR-VP), thus creating a link between Council and Commission interests and potentially more convergent aspirations. Post-Lisbon, the HR-VP also heads a complex secretariat or service organisation tasked with delivering CSDP, the European External Action Service (EEAS) (EEAS, 2019a). This began work in 2010 and has an annual budget of €680m (EEAS, 2019b). It comprises a network of specialist committees that liaise with several EU institutions (see Figure 24.1).

The executive and decision-making body in charge of CSDP is the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which authorises missions. It is composed of foreign policy ambassadors




Figure 24.1 CSDP structures

from all EU Member States. It liaises with foreign and defence ministers and works closely with the EU Military Committee and EU military staff within the EEAS. These are advisory to the PSC on issues concerning logistics, resourcing, and capability requirements for potential CSDP interventions, including training missions. They have a key role in force generation and matching provision to requirements. The PSC receives reports from the various mission commanders and takes advice from over 140 EU Delegations (EUDs) worldwide, each headed by an EU ambassador. EUDs are run by the EEAS and funded from the EEAS budget. They represent EU diplomacy in foreign affairs, and some regions maintain special representatives (SRs) who serve as the Union's eyes and ears regarding potential humanitarian concerns. Most SRs are in countries experiencing post-conflict challenges.

The PSC ultimately decides whether a CSDP operation goes ahead and confirms the resources needed, with Member States choosing whether and how much to contribute. Once a mission begins, the PSC receives regular reports on how it is meeting its mandate. Military operations require authorisation not only from the PSC but also from the United Nations and regional actors close to the theatre of intervention. Another significant body that shapes CSDP policymaking and works closely with the HR-VP is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), one of the most important Council committees, composed of Member State ministers for foreign affairs.

Yet another prominent organisation in the Brussels CSDP network is the European Defence Agency (EDA), a Brussels-based EU agency separate from the EEAS. It is tasked with analysing defence and security capability and producing assessments of future needs. It also advises on procurement and highlights efficiency gains if Member States would cooperate and share resources rather than pursuing national interests through protectionism, including favouring national suppliers. It makes recommendations for joint development projects and on pooling and sharing where this may bring efficiency and capability gains (see Karampekios and Oikonomou, 2021, in this book).

A historical consequence of a lack of cooperation is interoperability problems and duplication between systems, equipment, and national armed forces. This longstanding concern is illustrated by former Commission President Juncker's claim that there are 17 different combat tanks among EU Member States, while the United States manages with just one (Juncker, 2017). In the naval sector, much the same applies for frigate-type boats designed for combat operations. Since 2007, the European Defence Agency has tried to address this with regular capability assessments and recommendations.

The HR-VP chairs not only the EEAS but also the FAC and the EDA. Thus, the HR-VP is 'multi-hatted'. The role of vice president of the Commission links foreign affairs and CSDP on the one hand with the Commission on the other. Two other key bodies are the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). CIVCOM is an expert group that advises both the HR-VP and the PSC and other EEAS bodies. It also receives mission reports. COREPER is a service organisation for the Council and the PSC. It advises on priorities and sets the agenda for PSC meetings. The entire operation, including the whole EEAS, employs around 4,000 people, the majority seconded from Member States.

CSDP institutional development

This section describes institutional changes since the launch of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016. The British coalition government 2010–15 had displayed declining interest in CSDP and no enthusiasm for the developing any form of EU defence identity

(Heisbourg, 2016, p. 13). It preferred bilateral initiatives with France and was frustrated by other Member States' low levels of defence spending (O'Donnell, 2011; Biscop, 2012; Hammond, 2012). Indeed, London had long opposed initiatives that could enhance the profile of CSDP, such as a civilian mission headquarters in Brussels. The UK's referendum in 2016, however, triggered various CSDP-related developments that promised to raise the profile of the policy, improve coordination, and enhance Union engagement in defence and security. First, HR-VP Mogherini launched the EUGS (EEAS, 2016) just days after the UK referendum, and this seemed a declaration of intent. Next, the United Kingdom was excluded from the Foreign Affairs Council and other policymaking forums relevant to the future direction of CSDP.

Within months, the EU27 (28 less the United Kingdom) agreed to establish 'a permanent command and control structure at the military strategic level within the EU Military Staff' (EEAS, 2018). This body, the Military Planning Conduct Capability (MPCC), oversees non-executive military training missions in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic and has the potential to command a Battlegroup-sized (up to 1,500 troops) military intervention. It works closely with a Joint Support Coordination Cell to assist the military aspects of humanitarian intervention and liaises with Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). In 2017, the Commission announced the European Defence Fund (EDF), an EU-backed resource to support new defence-related research and development. Following a bilateral initiative from France and Germany in July 2017, in December, the Council finally launched Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a framework for coordinating cooperation on military capability enhancement. PESCO appeared in the Lisbon Treaty but had never been activated. A further step was Council authorisation of a related instrument, the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), which reports to the European Defence Agency. CARD is intended to provide a new instrument to pressure Member States to address capability shortfalls and to monitor progress towards capability enhancement. Its brief is to 'foster capability development addressing shortfalls, deepen defence cooperation and ensure more optimal use . . . of defence spending plans' (European Defence Agency, 2020). Together, the EDF, PESCO, and CARD constitute three separate but interlinked developments designed to enhance capability in the security and defence arena (Zandee, 2019, pp. 26–7).

The launch of PESCO was the headline move after publication of the EU Global Strategy. The idea is to allow groups of Member States to collaborate on research and development initiatives for defence-related hardware, thereby contributing directly to military capability. Sixteen projects were announced at the start, growing to 47 by the end of 2019. But PESCO ran into early difficulties. It was initially conceived as an instrument to allow small groups of Member States to launch projects. France envisioned around a dozen of the most committed and most capable contributing. Germany favoured a more inclusive approach, and in the end, many more Member States joined (Biscop, 2018a; Nováky, 2018). Inclusivity and multistate engagement risks 'free riding' by the less committed, a common CSDP concern (Witney, 2017). Free riding occurs when a state signs up but brings little to the table in terms of finance, expertise, or commitment.

PESCO has thus far failed to attract 'big ticket' strategic enablers. Notably outside of PESCO, Airbus Defence and Space launched a French, German, and Spanish collaboration for a new future combat aircraft system (Hoyle, 2019; Sprenger, 2020). Moreover, prospects for a unified European defence industrial base were dealt a blow by Brexit and by the UK's BAe Systems working on a rival to the Airbus fighter, with Swedish, Italian, and possibly Dutch partners. Ominously, an EDA official, cited in Brzozowski (2019), doubted the sustainability of Europe having two competing air combat projects.

Such rivalry illustrates the scale of the task facing the EDA and PESCO in promoting multi-lateral partnering and to assist development of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Under EDA guidance, PESCO ought to help, but it needs buy-in from Member States. There also needs to be a way to engage UK contractors, who, if left outside EU initiatives, will look to American partners. A concern is that British firms will not have access to the EDF or other defence research initiatives.

PESCO could facilitate timelier CSDP crisis intervention. From a theoretical perspective, it could build on the open method of coordination (OMC), a normative process identified at the Lisbon Council in 2000 (European Council, 2000; Radaelli, 2003). OMC is apparent in social and employment policy (Szyszczak, 2006; Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009; Kröger, 2009), in education (Drachenberg and Brianson, 2016), and in foreign and security policy (Sweeney and Winn, 2017; Sweeney, 2018). It consists of an iterative process of guidelines, policy coordination, and benchmarking at a grassroots level, including domestic or state-level legislation, which can lead to soft cooperation rather than the hard law and supranationalism that underpins the single market. It also suggests a form of institutional path dependency through EU structures (Pierson, 1996), as well as a manifestation of the transnational concept of 'shared sovereignty' articulated by Krasner (2005, p. 76).

The Commission has sought to raise its profile in security and defence, and to provide impetus for PESCO, by establishing the EDF. It applies the matched-funding principle already used for structural programmes designed to reduce inequality between EU regions (Institute for Government, 2020). The Commission initially promised €13bn for the EDF over the multi-annual period 2021–27, money intended to support transnational projects subject to a proportion of total expenditure coming from participating Member States and private-sector stakeholders. However, financial pressures during the coronavirus pandemic meant the sum allocated was cut to €7.9 billion (Fiott, 2020; Nováky, 2020; Quintin, 2020; Kelly, 2021). Any reduction undermines the EU quest for strategic autonomy (EEAS, 2020a), but the pandemic also strengthens the case for EU defence on geopolitical and economic grounds (Billon-Galland 2020; Biscop, 2020b).

The entry of the Commission into the security and defence domain could prove significant, potentially leading to more multilateral projects and stronger conditionality pressures, such as Commission oversight on allocation of EDF money. Against this, PESCO is essentially a Member State-initiated endeavour, and its success depends on individual governments' commitment. Equally important is that PESCO has been 'institutionalised [as] part of EU machinery now, and every year the Council will assess the National Implementation Plans that Member States will have to draw up' (Biscop, 2018b). Both PESCO and the EDF are intended to address the excessive fragmentation that remains characteristic of the European military-industrial sector (Fiott, 2019, p. 7). They could potentially address capability limitations and therefore benefit both the EU and NATO (Biscop, 2019b, p. 17).

As a precursor to the EDF, the Commission launched a €590-m research fund, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), designed to promote multinational R&D projects and EU-NATO cooperation. EDIDP also uses the co-financing principle mentioned previously. The first annual call for proposals to EDIDP was issued in March 2019 (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b). Both the EDIDP and another 2017 Commission initiative, the Preparatory Action for Defence Research (PADR), will be absorbed into the EDF once it is activated in 2021 (Béraud-Sudreau, 2019).

Despite all this innovation, President Macron of France had reservations which provoked a unilateral step first aired at the Sorbonne in 2017 (Macron, 2017). Concerns over free riding, a continued lack of strategic coherence, and PESCO's basis in support from as many Member

States as possible ran counter to French aspirations that it should be limited to the genuinely able and willing. Macron was concerned that EU structures, including PESCO, would be too unwieldy and would fail to bring much capability uplift or sufficiently rapid crisis response. He therefore launched the European Intervention Initiative, commonly referred to as EI2 (Nováky, 2018, p. 3). France was frustrated by the lack of EU financial support for its Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic, and then, following several terrorist attacks in 2015, Germany and other EU partners refused to take the fight to Isis/Daesh, nor did they engage with operations in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa which would have allowed France to focus on fighting Isis (*ibid*, p. 4). Thus, the French view was that CSDP was proving little more than symbolic and lacking operational significance.

Participation in the EI2 was invitation only but not limited to EU members. From the outset, EI2 appeared to take account of the UK's imminent departure from the EU. The initiative met with a cool reception from Germany in particular, but Berlin eventually signed up. It was officially launched in June 2018, becoming operational in November (Nováky, 2018). Membership included Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It constitutes military cooperation outside of NATO structures and unrelated to the EU's developing defence identity. Finland joined in November 2018, and Sweden and Norway, a non-EU member, were added in 2019 when Italy also submitted a request to take part (*Euroactiv*, 2019). EI2 is meant to avoid duplication of existing structures in the EU or NATO. It is clearly French led, and its secretariat is in Paris. Moreover, EI2 was meant to be operationally focused and to be 'an ambitious, demanding framework for operation cooperation' (Ministère de la Défense, 2017, p. 86).

Regarding the United Kingdom, EI2 builds on the bilateral 2010 Lancaster House Treaties between London and Paris. It is intended to bring benefits to both PESCO and NATO and will cooperate and draw on EU initiatives where appropriate. Perhaps most significant is that it is French led; independent of the EU; and separate from, but compatible with, NATO (Witney, 2018). These conditions are consistent with French preferences dating back to the failed European Defence Community idea in 1954, abandoned following rejection by the French National Assembly. In the 1960s, President de Gaulle unilaterally withdrew France from the NATO North Atlantic Council. France did not reintegrate with NATO military command until 2009, during the Sarkozy presidency (*Guardian*, 2009).

CSDP missions and operations

According to the EU's CSDP webpages, the headline objectives of CSDP are peacekeeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, and prevention of human trafficking and piracy (CSDP, 2020). Since the early 2000s, the EU has launched 36 CSDP missions and operations (see Tables 24.2 and 24.3). Eighteen are ongoing, three of which are military operations, while a further six military operations have been completed. Most missions have been civilian, mainly police training, border monitoring, and security sector reform (SSR). The largest civilian mission under the CSDP umbrella is EULEX Kosovo, launched in 2008 as a rule of law mission. It has focused on policing and judicial structures and advising on institutional development (EEAS, 2019c).

As well as EUFOR Althea mentioned previously, there have been three other large-scale military operations, all naval. EUNAVFOR Atalanta, launched in 2008, is an anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. It has achieved considerable success in securing a sharp decline in piracy incidents in the Indian Ocean. It continues as a surveillance mission to ensure safe passage of vessels, crew, and cargo. Second, EUNAVFOR MEDITERRANEA (later MED

Sophia) began in 2015 in the southern-central Mediterranean north of Libya in response to the escalating humanitarian crisis involving migrants fleeing war, poverty, and persecution, mainly in Afghanistan and Syria (BBC News, 2015a). Many other countries have been sources of refugees and asylum seekers seeking better futures in Europe. These include Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan (CAFOD, 2019). The operation was launched with impressive speed in June 2015 following the sinking in April of a migrant vessel off the coast of Lampedusa with the loss of over 650 lives (BBC News, 2015b). It was presented primarily as a humanitarian rescue intervention. It was later renamed EU NAVFOR MED Sophia after a baby girl born on a rescue ship in 2016. Sophia ended in March 2020, replaced by a new operation, EU NAVFOR MED IRINI.

Sophia was criticised for ambiguities over its real purpose. Perhaps it had too many objectives. Ostensibly humanitarian, critics highlighted its many tasks, sometimes contradictory (Riddervold and Bosilca, 2017; Cusumano, 2019; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018). The operation mandate referred to disrupting smuggler networks, breaking the business model underpinning human trafficking, and rescuing migrants from drowning. But it was clearly intended to reduce the flow of migrants to Europe by upholding migration law under the EU Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). CSDP is within the remit of Common Foreign and Security Policy, so Sophia was a foreign policy operation undertaking AFSJ objectives, specifically the protection of Europe's borders. Moreover, it worked with two AFSJ agencies, EUROPOL and the border agency Frontex, renamed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in 2019. Thus, Sophia was far from simply a response to a humanitarian crisis. In part, at least, it sought to keep migrants out of Europe. On this basis, it gained support from several Member States.

Table 24.2 summarises CSDP missions completed since 2003. Part A are military, Part B civilian. Military operations marked as 'Berlin Plus' (Concordia and Althea) draw on NATO assets. Table 24.3 shows the nineteen ongoing missions at the time of writing (November 2021). The tables show the wide geographical deployment and range of missions undertaken.

Sophia's complicated and possibly contradictory humanitarian rescue and border protection role posed serious challenges to its moral legitimacy. The apparent militarisation of a humanitarian intervention led to controversy (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2019). Not only did Sophia deploy military assets to deal with migrants and smugglers, but also the operation's remit was extended to upholding UN Security Council Resolutions banning arms supplies to Libya and Libyan oil exports (EU NAVFOR Med, 2019; UNSCR, 2018). In a further twist, Sophia provided training for the Libyan coast guard and navy (European Council, 2019; EU NAVFOR Med, 2019).

The complexity and breadth of the mandate contributed to the decision to close the operation in March 2020 and launch a new naval mission, EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, which began in April 2020. Its primary objective is to prevent arms moving in and out of Libya and therefore to impede the country's civil war. Disrupting the business around migrant smuggling was secondary, along with curtailing oil exports (*Euroactiv*, 2020; EEAS, 2020d). The change reflected disagreement over the success or otherwise of Sophia's humanitarian efforts as well as concerns about how best to prevent arms reaching Libya's warring factions.

In defence of Sophia and EU engagement in a Mediterranean Gordian knot, while the previous criticisms are understandable, compared with other powers around the world, EU refugee and asylum policy is rather benign. Refugees and asylum seekers are for the most part dealt with through due process, and many migrants have been settled in Europe, especially in Germany and Sweden. Commission efforts towards fair distribution met with resistance from many Member States. Despite problems, migrants are not routinely expelled or denied safety if picked up by non-governmental organisations, Member State patrol vessels, European Border and Coast Guard/Frontex, or previously by Operation Sophia. Sophia is reported to have rescued

Table 24.2 Completed CSDP missions: A) military, B) civilian, 2003–2020

A) CSDP military missions		
	Dates	Type of mission/mission strength/states involved/cost etc.
CONCORDIA FYROM	05/03–01/04	Berlin Plus €6.2m total 350 troops 13MS, 14TS
ARTEMIS DR Congo	05–09/03	Autonomous €7m 2,000 troops 14MS, 3TS
EUFOR RD Congo	08–11/06	€23m Athena OHQ in Germany 2,400 troops 21MS, 2TS
EUFOR TCHAD RCA	01/08–03/09	€120m Athena 3,700 troops 23MS, 3TS
EUFOR RCA	02/14–03/15	French led. 700 troops 10MS, 1TS
EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA	06/15–03/20	Naval operation, ships and air assets; partnership with European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), Europol. 26MS. July 2019–5 aircraft (Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Poland, France)
B) CSDP civilian missions (including military training)		
	Dates	Type of mission/comments
EUMM W. Balkans	01/03–12/07	M Serbia/Mont, Kos, BiH, FYRM, Albania. Max. 600 in 1967
EUPM BiH	01/03–06/12	P €32.9m total 540 staff, 27MS, 7TS; 27MS, 6TS
EUPOL Proxima/EUPAT FYRM	12/03–06/06	P €30.95m total; 186 police officers
EUPAT FYRM	12/05–06/06	P Police Advisory Team €1.5m 30 police officers
EUJUST-THEMIS Georgia	07/04–07/05	RoL €2,050m total 10 EU experts 10 MS
EUPOL Kinshasa/EUPOL RDC	04/05–06/07	P €4.3m 23 international staff 6 MS
EUSEC RD Congo	06/05–06/15	SSR €4.6m 26 international staff 7 MS
EUJUST LEX Iraq	07/05–12/13	RoL €15.4m 53 International, 13 local EU MS + Norway
AMIS EU Sudan	07/05–12/07	A 30 police, 15 military experts; 2 military observers; 15 MS
AMM Aceh	08/05–12/06	M €15m 125 EU staff, 93 ASEAN; 12 MS, 7 TS, 5 ASEAN
EUPOL RD Congo	07/07–09/14	P SSR 31 staff, 7 MS. Close cooperation with UN Mission in DRC
EUPOL Afghanistan	07/07–12/16	P €58m 206 staff, plus 178 local 23 MS
EU SSR Guinea Bissau	05/08–09/10	SSR €7.6m total; 8 international staff, 16 local. 4 MS
EUAVSEC South Sudan	06/12–01/14	SA Aviation Security. 34 international, 15 local staff
EUMAM RCA	03/15–07/16	SSR €7.9m 60 international staff
KEY: A = assistance B = border M = monitoring MT = military training P = police RoL = rule of law SA = support/assistance SSR = security sector reform MS = Member States TS = Third states (Budgets annual unless stated otherwise)		

Source: Author compilation, data from EEAS, 2020b, 2020c

44,000 migrants since 2015 (*Economist*, 2019), while Frontex, operating across the Mediterranean region, achieved 117,966 interceptions of 'irregular migrants' and rescued 37,000 individuals in search and rescue operations in 2018 (Frontex, 2019, p. 110). In 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis, 1.3m migrants sought asylum in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland (Pew

Table 24.3 Ongoing CSDP missions: A) military, B) civilian, 2003–2020

A) CSDP military missions

	Start date	Type of mission/mission strength/states involved/cost etc.
EUFOR Althea BiH	12/04	Berlin Plus, €10.3m under Athena mechanism 7,000 troops in 2004, 2,200 in 2009, 600 in 2020.17MS, 3TS
EU NAVFOR Somalia Atalanta	12/08	€14.7m Athena. Began as EUNAVCO, first EU naval mission Approx. 1200 personnel 20MS, 2TS
EU NAVFOR MED IRINI	04/20	Naval operation – maritime, satellite, air assets. Mandate 1) disrupting arms supplies to/from Libya 2) disruption of smuggling/human trafficking

B) CSDP civilian missions (including military training)

	Start date	Type of mission/Comments
EUBAM Moldova- Ukraine	11/05	B 100 international staff, 120 local (not managed by CSDP structures)
EUPOL COPPS Palestine	01/06	P €12.65m 71 international staff, 35 local. All MS may take part, 3TS
EUBAM Rafah	10/06	B Palestinian Occ. Terr. €2m 18 EU staff All MS may take part
EULEX Kosovo	07/08	RoL €85.6m 450 international and local staff. All MS, 6 TS
EUMM Georgia	10/08	M €38.2m (2018–20); 200+ international staff (civ/police/mil.) All MS
EUTM Somalia	04/10	MT €11.4m 203 international staff 7 MS, 1 TS
EUCAP SOMALIA	07/12	CSA maritime/anti-piracy €66m/2 years 93 staff + 18 local 15 MS, 4 TS
EUCAP SAHEL Niger	07/12	CSA €9.16m 120 int. staff, 31 local. 14 MS.
EUBAM Libya	05/13	B €66.6m (01/19–06/20) 17 international staff; 11 MS
EUTM Mali	01/13	MT €133m (2020–24) 80 international staff 22 MS 6 TS
EUAM Ukraine	01/14	CSA SSR €27m 177 international staff, 171 local 25 MS 2 TS
EUCAP SAHEL Mali	01/15	CA SSR €35.5m 136 international, 53 local 18 MS 3 TS
EUTM RCA	07/16	MT €37m (2 years) 181 staff 8 MS, 4 TS
EUAM IRAQ	10/17	CA SSR €79.5 80 International staff, 33 local
EUAM RCA	08/20	CA €7.1m 66 International staff
EUMT MOZ Mozambique	11/21	MT €15.16m ca. 140 international staff 10 MS

KEY: CA = civilian advisory B = border M = monitoring MT = military training P = police RoL = rule of law CSA = civilian support/assistance SSR = security sector reform MS = Member States TS = Third states

(Budgets annual unless stated otherwise)

Source: Author compilation, data from EEAS, 2020b, 2020c

Research, 2016). Germany received 442,000 applications, while Hungary (174,000) and Sweden (156,000) received the next-highest numbers. France (71,000) and the United Kingdom (39,000) received comparatively few. Against population size, the comparisons are even more striking, as Hungary received 1,770 applications per 100,000 population, Sweden 1,600, and Germany 540, compared with France's 110 and the UK's 60 (Pew Research, 2016).

In spring 2020, a new migration crisis appeared in prospect as Turkey threatened to suspend detention of refugees fleeing war in Syria and heading towards Europe. Ankara claims that the

EU is not keeping to financial promises to secure its cooperation in keeping migrants out of the European Union (BBC News, 2020). Turkey is accommodating 3.7m refugees from Syria, as well as others from Iraq and Afghanistan (BBC News, 2020).

Other CSDP missions include military training operations in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic. Security sector reform missions are active in Mali, Somalia, and Niger. SSR comprises training for state security providers and assistance in developing resilience against serious organised crime and terrorism. In the case of Somalia, this includes civilian law enforcement, police development, and maritime security, including training of coast guards (EUCAP SOMALIA, 2019).

Critiquing CSDP: more rhetoric than substance?

The EU's common security and defence policy has been the subject of much academic debate, mostly critical. A common view is that the European Union lacks a coherent strategic culture, does not match its claim to be comprehensive in the instruments deployed, and that Member States lack commitment to defence as an integral part of CSDP (Biscop, 2009, 2013; Biscop et al., 2009; Howorth, 2009, 2010, 2014, 2019a; Chappell, 2012; Simón, 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen, 2012; Shepherd, 2003; de France and Witney, 2013; Witney, 2008, 2017, 2019).

A much-cited realist critique said that Europeans were 'from Venus', while Americans were 'from Mars' (Kagan, 2004). Kagan argued that while the United States appreciated the need for military strength and warfighting where necessary, in Europe, a different mindset prevailed, based on the Kantian ideal of 'perpetual peace'. But Kagan's thesis lacked understanding of what the European Union is essentially about, especially if contrasted with the United States (Menon et al., 2004). The United States has by far the largest defence budget on Earth and maintains almost 800 military bases worldwide (Vine, 2015). The United States is a world power in military terms, exercising a self-appointed role as global policeman while also resolutely pursuing its own interests. There were signs under the Trump presidency (2016–20) of the United States stepping back from military interventionism, but its military budget continued to rise. US defence spending is greater than the next ten countries combined (Amadeo, 2020a). Moreover, Kagan appears to disregard the fact that the European Union was founded after the Second World War as a peace project, determined to ensure no further conflict between its members, notably Germany and France (Schumann Declaration, 1950). It began as a coal and steel community, placing these resources under a common authority, thus removing the capability for building a war machine from states that had been involved in periodic attempts to annihilate each other since the early Middle Ages during the reign of Emperor Charlemagne. Indeed Gallic-Germanic rivalry can be traced to pre-Roman times, so the European integration process arguably emerged from centuries of conflict, although it was also a more immediate response to the trauma of the Second World War (Sweeney, 2016, p. 27).

As the European Economic Community developed into an integrated market of 28 Member States, 19 using a single currency, 'the world's largest single market with transparent rules and regulations' (European Commission, 2020b) and third-largest economy after China and the United States (Amadeo, 2020b), its political profile required that it engage more with neighbourhood threats and new challenges related to contemporary globalisation. A common definition of globalisation refers to events in one part of the world having an impact in other distant regions (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). The realities of globalisation explain why a body as large as the EU with over 500 million citizens could not shirk from its responsibilities towards its neighbourhood and the wider world, nor could it depend on Member States to take the lead.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (2018) quoted the late Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak: 'There are only two kinds of states in Europe: small states, and small states that have not yet realised they are small'. This is an invocation, even from a German perspective – Germany being by far the largest economy in Europe – to get serious about the need for common defence. At issue for the Union is the failure among Member States to commit to a common strategic culture. This weakness is underscored by a failure to recognise and articulate common foreign policy interests. While some common interests are understood, Member States have often been reluctant to provide the resources necessary to ensure a collective and adequate response. Critics complain that CSDP is a minimalist policy based on the lowest common denominator: instead of a focus on what is needed, attention rests on what all will accept (Toje, 2008, 2011; Smith, 2008, p. 10, Rynning, 2011, p. 30; Chappell and Petrov, 2014, p. 3).

A European Parliament study highlights funding deficiencies (Wilkinson, 2020, p. 7) and reports that 80 percent of defence expenditure in the EU is at the state level rather than in collaborative European initiatives (Uttley, 2018). This weakens the prospects for a strong European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The study confirms that EU-level funding represents only a small part of Member State defence spending: while the EDF contribution is hardly insignificant, the report doubts that it can be transformative for the EDTIB (Wilkinson, 2020, p. 12). Member States tend to pursue protectionist procurement policies, investing much more in domestic defence industries. Also concerning is that Commission spending on 'Global Europe' will be further squeezed by other priorities, notably tensions within the Eurozone, specifically between Germany and France, over how to resolve imbalances between north and south and sovereign indebtedness in several Member States (Münchau, 2019, 2020). In addition, recovery from the coronavirus pandemic will further squeeze spending on defence and security.

Arguments over priorities ensure that CSDP remains a Cinderella policy domain, a mere fraction of the Union's annual spending. For military operations, the so-called Athena mechanism applies, meaning 'costs lie where they fall', so contributing Member States pay their own costs for personnel seconded to a CSDP operation. This deters participation, which is optional anyway. The EU lacks the resources to deploy personnel to a crisis. The most that even the PSC can do is call for contributions.

Still another CSDP weakness is the unevenness of contributions and the degree to which states free ride on the efforts and spending of others. This concern also applies regarding NATO burden-sharing. Central to all criticism is that common foreign and security policy, and therefore CSDP, is an intergovernmental domain. Fundamentally, 'states call the shots' (Moser, 2020, p. 4). They determine whether to launch a mission; the resources it receives; and, individually, whether to contribute or take part. Despite its expanding bureaucracy and wealth of expertise, the European External Action Service is entirely beholden to Member States' political will and commitment.

Notwithstanding its shortcomings, CSDP achieved a lot in its first ten years. It was disappointing that subsequently the policy appeared to lose steam, and as austerity began to bite during the Euro crisis post-2010, there was little appetite for renewed investment in defence (Koutrakos, 2013, p. 130). Security threats, on the other hand, appeared in all directions, with crises unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa and in Ukraine, renewed instability in the Balkans over migration, and dissent with the post-Dayton status quo in Bosnia. Terrorism, cybersecurity, and deteriorating relations with Russia all added to pressure for Europeans to address their own defence and internal stability and that of their neighbourhood. After years of decline, several NATO members began to reverse cuts in defence spending (Dimitrova, 2017).

Another European Parliament report identified three areas of longstanding weakness in CSDP (Meyer, 2020). First, incompatible attitudes among Member States regarding the use of force; second, resource disincentives and other barriers to European solidarity; and finally, gaps between early warnings regarding potential crises and early action or rapid reaction. A further complication lies in the legal provisions underpinning CSDP, highlighted by Koutrakos (2013). While the Treaty of Lisbon gave the Union a 'legal personality', thus authorising CSDP actions, it also reaffirms the power of Member State law. This means that contrary forces compete, either driving the policy area forward or limiting the extent to which Member States are bound by it (Koutrakos, 2013, p. 78).

While these criticisms are valid, CSDP benefits from significant advantages. The European Union is broadly recognised as an honest broker in foreign interventions. CSDP missions are authorised by Member States and by the Council of the EU. They are launched following invitation from the government of the state concerned, backed by a UNSC resolution, or both. EU peacebuilding is conducted in accordance with the UN Charter Art.2(1) on state sovereignty and UN Charter Art.2(4) on the use of force (Moser, 2020, p. 4). They are generally welcomed, and military operations may have support from other stakeholders such as the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), and NATO. CSDP commits to humanitarian intervention, something NATO is less equipped to do. As well as being a manifestation of EU soft power, missions are frequently understood as driven by humanitarian need and judged to make a positive contribution to civilian crisis management. Given CSDP's framework of international legitimacy, it seems unlikely, and hardly desirable, that the European Union should aspire to match the United States in military ambition or capability. For all its spending and Kaganesque power, the United States has hardly excelled or enhanced its reputation through its many foreign military engagements since 1945. It also remains to be seen whether Russia or Turkey gain any sustained advantage from deploying force on either side in Syria's decade-long civil war.

The EU clearly seeks to progress its strategic interests in other ways, notably through its comprehensive approach, which embraces soft power as well as military instruments. But while some commentators discern an emergent strategic culture (Hadfield, 2007; Biava et al., 2011; Biava, 2011), others counter that the Union and Member States lack coherence in this respect (Howorth, 2010, 2014; Howorth and Menon, 2009; Biscop, 2009; Biscop and Coelmont, 2012; Helwig, 2013; Cottey, 2019). Despite notable institutional development since 2016, a significant increase in Member State governments' political will is needed to shift CSDP towards achieving the strategic autonomy referred to in the EU Global Strategy.

The latest attempt to breathe coherence into CSDP is the Strategic Compass, announced by the German presidency of the Council in 2020. It has three purposes: to draw up a common threat analysis for the EU, to agree to clear and achievable strategic objectives in security and defence, and to provide political guidance for future military planning processes. Planning for the Strategic Compass revolves around four dimensions: crisis management, resilience, capability development, and partnerships (Mölling and Schütz, 2020, p. 4). Biscop cautions that it must pursue both political and military ambition and be co-authored by civilian and military experts in the EEAS; it should also provide for a new Headline Goal (Biscop, 2019c, pp. 3–4).

Conclusion – Brexit and risks to European defence

CSDP has been 20 years in the making. It has yet to fully realise the ambitions set out in the Saint Malo Declaration or in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). It does, however, make a significant contribution to EU foreign policy. In terms of its Common Foreign and Security Policy,

'the EU is a shared political project in search of a transnational strategy' (Winn, 2017, p. 277). The EUGS is another attempt to bring strategy into focus through the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

CSDP probably punches above its weight given its small budget. It has not resulted in an independent and autonomous EU force. In no way does it constitute an EU army. The changing threat environment suggests that Europeans will need to do more to look after their interests and those of the EU neighbourhood (Heisbourg and Terhalle, 2018; Fiott, 2018). Threats abound, and Europeans may question the wisdom of relying on the United States to guarantee their security given the reorientation of American priorities towards the Pacific region and China, apparent even before the Trump era. The so-called 'Asia pivot' (Albert, 2016; Clinton, 2011; Liao, 2013; Berteau et al., 2014) prompted renewed calls for European states to contribute more to NATO, and to prepare for full strategic autonomy (Vaské, 2018; Järvenpää et al., 2019; Domecq, 2019; Whitman, 2019). Closer to home, a resurgence in Russian belligerence as evidenced by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, sponsorship of insurgency in the Donbas region of Ukraine, the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 with the loss of 298 lives in July 2014, the installation of nuclear-capable missile systems in Kaliningrad, and the Novichok poisonings in the UK city of Salisbury highlighted Cold War-type tensions returning to the European continent. President Putin's support for the Assad regime in the Syrian war further soured EU relations with Russia.

It is against this context of rising threats that the need for greater strategic coherence and capability in CSDP and the parallel French EI2 initiative should be understood. One possibility is that EI2 becomes a PESCO initiative combined with an integrated and mandatory CARD process. To realise strategic autonomy, CSDP will need to upgrade decisively from its mainly civilian crisis management role and become a vehicle for enhanced defence capability.

The prospects for a merger between EI2 and PESCO are complicated by the UK position. Given that UK participation in PESCO is considered unlikely, the British-French link through the Lancaster House Treaties looks more promising, utilising the contribution of the Joint Expeditionary Force created between the United Kingdom and France in 2016 (HM Government, 2016). This kind of bilateral initiative is preferred by the United Kingdom and looks a more plausible prospect for French-British partnership post-Brexit than an EU framework like PESCO. The irony is that for the EU to achieve the strategic autonomy implied by its Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016), it needs the UK's military-industrial research and production capacity (Whitman, 2019).

Strategic autonomy is a French priority, judging by the 2017 strategic defence and national security review, where the phrase appears no fewer than 26 times. The review suggests a shift in French thinking towards European as opposed to EU strategic autonomy (Ministère de la Défense, 2017; Mauro, 2018; Franke and Verma, 2019). A European Council on Foreign Relations study reveals European strategic autonomy is a contested phenomenon in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland, and the Netherlands but considered important in France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Greece, Latvia, and Romania. Other EU Member States consider it somewhat important, except Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Ireland, for whom it is not important (Franke and Varma, 2019). The same report affirms that Paris understands that a close EU/UK relationship is fundamental to strategic autonomy.

Brexit threatens this ambition. It also undermines the viability of the UK's defence industry. Both sides need each other to maintain relevance (Biscop, 2016). Fresh thinking, and pragmatism on all sides, may shift positions towards CSDP structures that can accommodate the United Kingdom as a third country, including vital engagement in military-industrial projects (Faleg, 2016). CSDP may also adjust to a greater strategic role for Germany, stepping up to partner

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France (Martill and Sus, 2018, p. 852). To this end, Berlin's security white paper (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016), was described as 'a paradigm shift' in strategic thinking, a transition from civilian power towards sharing in responsibility for international security (Faleg, 2016). The European Parliament (2016) has called for an EU White Book on security and defence as a step towards a European Defence Union. Any such development would be greatly strengthened by British participation, including UK access to the European defence market.

Britain is Europe's strongest military force, accounting for 20 percent of European armed forces, and 40 percent of its military industrial and research base (Round et al., 2018). Britain and France are the only European countries with full-spectrum military capability, including nuclear weapons (IISS, 2019; Mölling and Giegerich, 2018). The United Kingdom is NATO's second-highest contributor after the United States. Its strategic culture, like France, permits 'out-of-area' force deployment. Post-Brexit, the continuation of a strong military partnership between Britain and France, and through this a bilateral relationship with the European Union, would be in all parties' mutual interest (Hill, 2018; Wright, 2017; Sweeney and Winn, 2020) and essential to Europe achieving strategic autonomy (Whitman, 2019; Biscop, 2016).

Brexit therefore risks damaging British and European security interests in many ways, both internally and externally. A loss of political, diplomatic, and strategic influence will have severe implications for the United Kingdom and for the European Union. The challenge is to seek pragmatic and hard-nosed solutions that maintain a close partnership despite the United Kingdom leaving the Union. This partnership should include the military-industrial sector, where Brexit places enormous strain on joint projects, including UK participation in Airbus and Galileo, the EU's satellite system which serves dual-purpose civilian and military applications (see Lieberman, 2021, in this book). Airbus SE is the consolidated company that absorbed various subsidiaries including the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS). Strong military industrial partnering would seem to be a prerequisite for European strategic autonomy, while PESCO provides a framework within which such collaboration could occur (Biscop, 2018a, 2018b).

Large-scale capability enablers such as satellite systems or new aircraft development can only be damaged by competitive rivalry between Member States who will need to cooperate to bring such projects to fruition. One of Britain's most decisive and far-reaching choices going forward will be how to position military-industrial cooperation. It may choose to develop transatlantic ties with American firms like Boeing and Lockheed Martin, in which case it will be a junior partner at the beck and call of US interests. The political implications will be profound. The alternative is to build a more equal partnership with France, Germany, and others in a pan-European quest for strategic autonomy and even relevance in a world of great and growing powers. There are signs of closer Franco-German cooperation in developing strategic enablers, including large projects for aircraft, tanks, and anti-missile systems. These are long-term and far more likely to be successful with UK involvement.

CSDP may find a way to embrace the non-EU French-led E12. Or it may simply consolidate around civilian crisis management, but even if it takes this more modest route, it will require more capability and more commitment from Member States. Against the rising threat environment, including instability in the European neighbourhood and fallout from the climate emergency, Europeans, the United Kingdom included, will need to build capability and strategic autonomy. As Heisbourg and Terhalle (2018) affirmed, 'Europeans will have to fend for themselves'.

It is important to note that in the year that this book goes to press, we face a global pandemic in COVID-19. The virus will surely disrupt EU security planning. Its impact on CSDP will

be considerable. Given the scale of the economic fallout, CSDP will lose financial support and attention will focus on broader priorities. But 'the EU should not completely abandon its pre-Covid-19 security and defence agenda' (Nováky, 2020, p. 1). The need for a more strategic and more capable EU security and defence policy has not diminished, but it has become even more challenging (Sweeney and Winn, 2021).

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